FRARY ET AL. vs. BOOTH ET AL.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
FRARYrAND OTHERS VS. BOOTH .AND OTHERS. 1
A married woman contracting a debt for her own benefit, may make it an express charge on her separate estate, and her mortgage for that purpose will be
supported in equity.
A husband may by his acts, as well as by express agreement, divest himself
of his marital rights in his wife's property so as to make it her separate estate.
A wife left her husband in 1847. In 1852, property was devised to her, which
she occupied and controlled without any interference of her husband until the
present time. In 1857 she made a mortgage upon her estate to secure payment
of a debt for necessaries for the support of herself and children, and in 1858 she
obtained a divorce and made a second mortgage on the same property. Held,
that though as between her and the husband the devise to her lacked the affirmative words necessary to constitute a separate estate in the strict meaning of the
terms, yet under the circumstances it was to be considered her separate estate
as between her and the first mortgagee.
Such first mortgage may also be supported in equity on the principle that
where a married woman trades as a feme sole, or obtains credit on her separate
estate, a court of equity will hold the proceeds of the business or the estate subject to the claims of her creditors.
Or on the principle that the estate of a married woman living apart from her
husbanad Is liable for her maintenance.
The second mortgage having been made with notice of the circumstances, has
no equity to come in before the first.
The statutes of Vermont, in regard to the conveyance of married women's
estates, do not affect the jurisdiction of the courts of equity over the subject of
separate estates.

Appeal from the Court of Chancery in and for the county of
Orange.
ifebard, for the orators.
Peck, for the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-In this case the following are the facts material
to the leading questions presented in the argument. Mrs. Booth
was the adopted daughter of Mr. Norton, and, up to the time of
her marriage, lived in his family in Strafford. Soon after her
marriage she went with her husband to Canada, where he had
relatives, and lived with him a short time, and then (sometime
BARRETT,

1 We are indebted for this case to the kindness of Mr. Justice BAnRrT.
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prior to 1847) returned to her home in Strafford with two children, issue of the marriage. Her husband has ever since remained
in Canada. Till the death of Mr. Norton, in 1853, she continued to live in his family, taking a leading part in household
affairs, and receiving support for herself and children, except
that she furnished their clothing. In 1852, Mr. Norton made
his will, giving to Mrs. Booth his home, farm, stock, horses, farming tools, &c. After his decease the will was duly probated and
established, and Mrs. Booth has continued to reside in the family
homestead, holding, occupying, and managing the property given
her by the will, supporting .herself and children without any aid
from her husband, and without any claim or interference by him
in respect to the control, management, or disposition of said property, and without any claim or offer by him to live with his wife
and children: he, during all the time, being destitute of property
and creflit, and wholly irresponsible. After the decease of Mr.
Norton, Mrs. Booth purchased goods of Frary & Co., and of
other stores in which Mr. Harris was interested as partner, ne-"
cessary for the support of herself and children, on credit given
solely to herself, in reliance on her right and interest in the property given her by said will. In settlement of the accounts for
said goods she executed the notes described in the bill in this
case, and on the 12th of October, 1867, she executed to Frary
a mortgage of said farm to secure the payment of said notes.
At the General Term of the Supreme Court in November, 1858,
she obtained a divorce from her husband, after which, and on the
24th day of said November, she executed a mortgage of the
same property to J. S. Moore, as set forth in his answer. Mr.
Moore was executor of said will of Mr. Norton, which will made
the debts of the testator, and the expense of settling his estate,a charge upon a piece of land in Granville, in case what should
be due to the estate should prove insufficient for that purpose.
Mrs. Booth makes defence on the ground that she was feme
covert when the orator's mortgage was executed, and that she
gave it upon compulsion by threats of suit and the attachment
of'her property. Mr. Moore defends on the same ground, and
insists that his mortgage is entitled to priority. He also defends
on the ground that, as executor, he has paid the debts of the
testator and the expense of administration under the will, out of
his own money; and, in any event, claims that he is entitled to
a lien upon said mortgaged property for such payment, in priority to the orator's mortgage.
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Upon the facts thus 6tated, with other incidental facts which
will appear in the course of the discussion, it is to be determined
whether the orators are entitled to enforce against the property
the security which said mortgage purports to give.
Before presenting the -views of the court upon the main grounds
upon which the case was discussed in the argument, we remark,
that we do not concur with the learned counsel for the defence,
in assuming as a conclusive proposition, that the mortgage executed by Mrs. Booth to'the orators is wholly void. At common
law, and irrespective of the statute of this state, it would be void
and ineffective; and it would be equally so in equity, unless the
purpose, occasion, and circumstances of giving it, bring it within
the operation of principles upon which courts of equity give such
instruments a"legitimate vitality and effect. Sec. 2, p. 448 of
Gen. St. :-- A husband and wife may, by their joint deed, convey the real estate of the wife in like manner as she might do by
her separate deed if she were unmarried," and the provisions of
ch. 71 of Gen. St., by which the wife may, in case of desertion
or ill treatment by the husband, make disposition of her property
without his joining in the deed, do not affect the.subject as it is
involved in and presented by this case. The first of said enactments does not declare the sole deed of the wife void, nor does
it -imply that it is, except as resulting from the effect of coverture
at common law. It has regard only to the effect of that relation
at common.law, and was designed to provide a mode by which
she might transfer the title to her real estate at law, notwithstanding the common law effect of coverture. It is an enabling
and not a disabling or restrictive act, and can by no means be
regarded as trenching upon the scope of equitable jurisdiction
and interposition in reference to the rights, liabilities, and duties
of married women in respect to their property and contracts.
In Buchanan vs. Chamberlin et al., in Orange county, 1858
(not reported), a mortgage, given by the wife to secure the payment of money borrowed to pay towards the purchase of the
mortgaged property, was held valid against the husband and the
children, the wife having deceased.
The latter of said statutory provisions was designed to give,
not an exclusive, but an additional and somewhat summary means
as against the husband, for insuring to the wife the use and
benefit of her own property for her support, -in case she should
be abandoned by, or compelled by ill-treatment to live apart
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from, him. They cannot, upon any ground of reason, be construed as taking away or curtailing the scope of interposition by
courts of equity in cases falling within the ordinary cognisance
of such courts.
Passing, without further remark, the point made in defenceupon the statutes referred to, we come to the more.important
ground of debate.
Ih courts of equity, for many purposes, the separate and unmerged existence of the wife, both in respect to her person, her
property, and her contracts, is recognised, asserted, and made
the ground of action to the same extent as if she had not been
married; and the course of adjudication has now pretty clearly
defined the principles, and indicated the category of cases upon
and in which this may properly be done. Within the scope of
those principles and cases, there are many cases in which, for the
purpose of protectingthe wife, and of doing justice to other parties, the wife has been treated as feme sole sub modo, and to a
limited extent,. in respect to contracts ..made by her, and in
respect to rights and interests in property held by or accruing

through her.
Though cases at law were largely cited in the argument by
orators' counsel, but little aid can be derived from them in dealing with this subject in the forum of equity. Some analogies of
principle, and some deductions of reason from them, may give
more or less countenance to the doctrine held and administered.
by courts, of equity, but the cases themselves can hardly be
regarded as establishing either principles or rules that control or
direct the action of those courts. It is to be determined, therefore, whether the principles and cases which appertain to this subject in those courts, require the relief to be granted that is
invokedby this bill.
In England it is established law in equity, that a feme covert
has the. same power, of charging or appropriating her separate
estate, as if she were feme sole, unless there be a restriction in
the instrument by which she is invested with such estate. The
main and important difference in respect to the extent of such
power in her, as held in England, and by the courts of different
states in this country, consists in this,-in some of the states it
is held that she can charge or appropriate her separate estate
only in -such manner and to such extent as she is expressly
authorized to do -by the instrument of conveyance or settlement;
VOL. XII.-O
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while in others it is held that she can charge or appropriate it,
for her own benefit, or for the benefit of her estate, as fully as
if sole, provided there be no restriction in this respect in the
instrument of conveyance or settlement. The English rule has
In Imlay vs. Huntington, 20
been adopted in Connecticut.
Conn. Rep. 146, STORRS, J., in the course of an elaborate
opinion, says :-" We adopt the. English rule, not only as supported by the highest authority, but because we think it is also
supported by the strongest reasons." The same is reasserted in
82 Conn. R.
In New York, in the case of The Methodist lpiscopal Church
vs. Jaques, 17 Johns. Rep. 548, upon the fullest consideration by
the Court of Error, the English rule was approved and maintained, though it may be regarded as subsequently limited to the
charge or appropriation by the wife for the benefit of herself or
her estate. In X. A. Coal Co. vs. Dyett, 7 Paige Rep. 9, it is
held that cc the feme covert, as to her separate estate, is considered as a feme sole, and may in person, or by her legally authorized agent, bind such separate estate with the payment of debts
contracted for the benefit of that estate, or for her own benefit,
upon the credit of the separate estate." And the same doctrine
is held in Gardnervs. Gardner, 7 Paige Rep. 112. In this last
case, when in the Court of Errors, 22 Wend. Rep., CowEN, J.,
held the following language :-cc If the wife holds an estate separate from and independent of her husband, as she may do in
equity, chancery considers her, in respect to her power over this
estate, as a feme sole; and although she is still incapable of
charging herself at law, and equally incapable in equity of charging herself personally with debts, yet I think the better opinion
is, that separate debts, contracted by her expressly on her own
account, shall, in all cases, be considered an appointment or appropriation for the benefit of the creditors, as to so much of her
separate estate as is sufficient to pay the debts, if she be not disabled to charge it by the terms of the donation."
The same rule as in N. A. Coal Co. vs. Dyett, supra, is recognised by the Vice-Chancellor, 2 Sanf Ch. Rep. 287, in Curtis vs.
-Engel, and is explicitly sanctioned in Yale vs. Dederer,18 N. Y.
Rep. 265. It is true, in this case, when again before the Court
of Appeals, 22 N. Y. Rep. 450, SELDEN, J., attempts to, weaken
the stability of the law as thus held and adhered to in New York.
While we cannot accord success to the attempt, yet it is perti-
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nent to the dase in hand to remark, that the court hold in that
case an express charge, created by a married woman upon her
separate estate for her own benefit, to be valid in equity.
In the recent case of Todd and others vs. Mfrs. Lee and husband, 15 Wis. Rep. 365, DixoN, C. J., upon an extended examination and discussion of the subject, says :-, Within all the
authorities, the separate estate of a married woman will be
charged in equity with the payment of debts contracted for her
benefit."
The lack of general equity powers in the courts has, perhaps,
precluded the adjudication of the subject in the New England
States, except Connecticut and Vermont; and in Vermont it has
not -before been called into judgment. We are prepared, however, to adopt the principle of the law as established in England,
Connecticut, and New York, to the extent, at least, that a mar-.
ried woman may charge her separate property for her own benefit (and that is all that the present case requires), regarding it as
resting in sound legal and moral reasons, and resulting in securing to the wife all proper protection, while effectuating justice
between her and those with whom she has dealt with reference
to and upon the credit of her separate property.
This brings us to the question,-was the property embraced in
the mortgage of Mrs. Booth to the orators, her separate property, within the true intent and spirit of the law, as held and
administered upon this subject, in a legitimate application of it
to the facts of this case? The will of Mr. Norton gave it to her
alone, without condition or limitation, its language being, cI
give and devise to Adeline Booth, ,of Strafford, all my homefarm, so called, consisting of about sixty-three acres, and also I
give and bequeath to her all my stock and horses," &c., &c. It
is clear, upon well-established principles applicable to title created by will, that she was vested with an absolute estate in fee in
the farm, subject only to the marital rights of the husband.
Separate estate in a married woman involves, as the characterizing fact, that she holds it to her sole use, in exclusion of the
marital rights of the husband' If the will had exprQssed it to
be to her sole use, in exclusion of the right of the husband to
control or dispose of it, it would have been her separate estate in
the fullest legal sense and effect of the expression, though it was
land given to her directly without the interposition of trustees.
In the earlier English cases, adopting the doctrine of the subject
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from the civil law, the 8eparate property consisted in personalty
invested, with provision that the wife should have the proceeds
to the extent and in the manner specified, or the income and proceeds of lands held by trustees. This, indeed, has been true of
most of the cases throughout the whole course of adjudications
upon this subject in the English equity courts. Hence, upon a
cursory view, the impression is easily derived, that separate estate
is predicable only of personalty invested, or of the income of
real estate vested in trustees. Even PRATT, J., in a dissenting
opinion in Albany Fire Ins. Co. vs. Bay, 4 Coins. Rep. 27,
says :-, Separate estates in married women, which courts of
equity recognise their right to dispose of as femes sole, are
strictly equitable estates. They are always created by deed, devise, or marriage settlement, vesting the legal estate in some
third person." But in the American note to the case of Rulme
vs. Tenant, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. p. 417, it is said, - the intervention of a trustee is not necessary to the validity of a trust to
the separate use of a married woman. If real or pbrsonal property be given to her separate use, her interest will be protected
by converting the husband into a trustee :" and a large number
of American cases is cited, which establish this as the. law in this
country. The case of Fanny Portervs. Bank of Butland and
others, 19 Vt. Rep. 410, adopts and stands upon this view of the
law. Indeed, the necessity of an actual or even an ideal trust,
in order to constitute a separate estate of the wife, which she
may bind for the payment of her debts, has been abandoned in
England, as appears by the case of Owens vs. JDickinson, 1: Craig.
& Phil. 48, and by the still later case of Johnson vs. aallager,
7 Loud. Jur. N. S. 273; and it is now held that such estate may
exist without the fact or fiction of a trustee, and be directly
reached-by execution out of the Court of Chancery.
As before remarked, the will gave to Mrs. Booth an absolute
title to the real estate; and we receive the impression from the
peculiar language of the deed, in giving it to her without naming
heirs, in connection with the fact that she was, and for a long
time had been, living apart from ler husband, with the burdei
of supporting herself and her children cast upon her, without
any care or aid from him; that it was the intention of the testator to give her the property named, both real and personal, as
her separate property. But it would, probably, be going too far
to say that the will itself, as an instrument conferring title, can
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be held to have that effect. It lacks the ordinary affirmative expressions which have been held requisite to exclude the husband
from his marital rights in property thus coming to the wife.
As already said, separate estate in a married woman involves,
as the characterizing fact, that she holds it to her sole use in exThe cases uniclusion of the marital rights of the husband.
formly show that the law of the subject had its origin, and has
been developed, established, and applied, with reference to claims
made by the husband, or by those standing in his right, in virtue
of his marital rights, as against the exclusive right of the wife
to the property in question. In such cases the rule has become
established that the instrument of conveyance or settlement must
edntain explicit words of exclusioi in order to shut out the husband and his assigns from his marital rights.
But in the present case, neither the husband, nor any one
under him, is claiming any right in the property. The will was
made during his separation from his wife; the testator died, and
the will took effect to pass the title to Mrs. Booth while the separation was continuing. She was left by the testator at his death
in the possession of the property as her home and resource for
support, atid she continued ever after in that possession, controlling and managing the property, without any interposition or
claim by her husband; being (as before said) left by him to support herself and children, without .any contribution or offer of
aid by him in that behalf. This, we think, may properly be
regarded as a practical and continuing negation, on his part, of
any right or interest in the property, in virtue of his marital
rights,-a practical and continuing construction and effect given
to the will, as giving to the wife the absolute title in exclusion
of himself as husband,-an effectual appropriation of the property to her sole and separate use.
If the husband, by an ante-nuptial agreement, had stipulated
that the property coming to the wife during coverture, should be
her sole and separate property, and subject to her exclusive disposal, such agreement would be effectual in equity to disembarrass the wife from any marital restraints in the disposition of
such property. .See Barron vs. Barron et al., 24 Vt. 375, in
which the cases involving the subject are extensively examined
and the law ably discussed by Is31Am, J.

So, too, a post-nuptial agreement of a similar character, made
upon sufficient consideration (as, for instance, that the wife should
supportiherself, or herself and' children, without calling on the

-
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husband therefor, if performed by the wife), would in equity be
held equally effectual. True, there was no such agreement, in
terms, in this case. Still, we think the facts before stated put
the husband in the same relation to this property as if there bad
been. We think no principle nor rule of the law is infringed in
the present case, in which the question does not arise upon a claim
by the husband or in his right, by holding that property which
the wife holds by absolute title and disembarrassed of any claim
resting upon the marital rights of her husband, is to be regarded
as her separate property, within the principles and in subserviency to the purposes of the law governing the subject; and that
in such case it makes no difference in what way it is invested
with such character of separate property. If it is thus held by
her, then, in equity, she has power to charge it for her own
benefit the same as if she were discovert.
We therefore hold that Mrs. Booth, for the credit which she
had obtained, was warranted in making the debts a charge upon
the land thus owned by her, and that the mortgage to the orators, which we find to have been given voluntarily and without
compulsion, constitutes an express charge upon, and appropriation of, the property for the payment of the debts specified
therein.
There is another line of judicial administration in equity, the
principle of which seems ample to warrant this court in effectuating the pledge of the prop'erty for the payment of the debts in
question; and that is, cases where the wife, with the consent of
the husband, has carried on business in her own name as sole
trader or otherwise. It is established beyond controversy, that
the property and proceeds of the business may be held by the
wife's creditors, for the payment of the debts contracted in that
business, against any claim or right of the husband, and, in most
cases, against his creditors. This was recently held by this court
in a case in Windsor county, not yet reported: Partridgeet a.
vs. Wardner et al. See Story Eq. § 1885-6-7, in which last
section it is said :-", If a husband should desert his wife, and
she should be enabled by the aid of friends to carry on a separate'
trade (as that of milliner), her earnings in sucl trade will be enforced in equity against the claims of her husband." This all
goes upon the ground that the creditors of the wife have an
equitable right to the property and proceeds of the business, in
reliance upon' which they extended to her the credit. As against
the wife that right is plain, and was never called in question. It
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has only been controverted upon some counter claim of the husband, his assigns or creditors.
Where, therefore, the wife, as in this case, has title to property
which the husband permits her to hold, use, and dispose of for
the support of herself and children, in his neglect to do anything in that behalf-he interposing no claim in respect to said
property, and she has obtained credit for the necessary means of
living in reliance upon such property, and has expressly pledged
it as security for the redemption of such credit, it would seem to
be interpolating a new principle both in equity law and in ethics,
to hold that she, or those standing in her right, may, in virtue
of a technical rule of marital disability, evade that equity of her
creditors. It would be matter of some difficulty to assign a
plausible, much more a solid reason for so holding. It certainly
.could not be on the score of any countervailing equity in her,
for none such exists, but the contrary. Nor could it be on the
score of disability, for that is excluded by well-known rules and
settled principles of equity law.
The result of the views already presented seems to be fully
warranted upon other grounds.
There are several ways, upon well-settled principles, in which,
as against the husband, the property of the wife would be subjected to the support of herself and children.
In G-uy vs. .Pearke8, 18 Yes. Rep. 196, the Lord Chancellor
ordered the Accountant- eneral to sell stocks held under a will
by a legatee whose husband had deserted her soon after marriage,
and for several years had furnished nothing for her support, and
to repay advances made from year to year by a friend of the
wife for her support, who made such advances upon the faith of
being repaid out of that fund, and that the dividends of the remaining fund be paid to her for her future support.
In the American notes to HJurrayvs. .ord Elibank, Lead. Cas.
in Eq. vol. 1, p. 496, it is said, " there is a class of decisions which
indicate that, where the husband has misbehaved, and abandoned
or ill-treated his wife, so as to justify a divorce or separation, the
wife's property in action, and it seems also even property not
under the jurisdiction of the court, will be laid hold of by the
Court of Chancery and appropriated to the support of the wife
and her children ;" and several cases to that effect are cited in
different states. It is further said: "It may probably, also, be
considered as established, that if the husband is entirely insolvent,
and the wife is without means of support, equity will sustain a
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bill by the wife, through her next friend, against the 'husband,
or his assigns or creditors, seeking to get possession of the property at law ;" and several cases to that effect are referred to.
In ifaviland vs. .Miter8, 6 J. C. R. 25, ChancellorKENT said:
c The rule was settled that the wife's equity to a suitable provision for the maintenance of herself and her bhildren out of her
separate real and personal estate, descended or devised to her
during coverture, was well established, and would prevail equally
against the husband or his assigns, and against any sale made or
lien created by him, even for a valuable consideration, or in payment of a just debt; * * * and this equity might be extended,
if the circumstances of the case should require it, to the whole of
the real and personal estate so devised or descended to the wife."
This savors strongly of the idea that even as against the husband
and those standing upon his right, the courts recognise a 8eparate
e8tate in the wife, for certain purposes, which was not created
such by express terms,-for in that case the property was inherited,-not de*ised or conveyed by deed: See .Drummond vs.
Magee, 4 J. C. R. 818. In closing a full, -elaborate, ana discriminating review of most of the cases bearing upon the wife's
rights in equity as to her own property, it is said in the note
above cited, on p. 501: c The maintenance of the wife from'her
own property, in cases of the -husband's .neglect ito provide for
her, is, no doubt, a ground of original jurisdiction to be exercised
upon a bill filed by her."
What'has thus been said in the note, as above cited, and held
in the cases referred to, we regard as sound in principles, and
sustained by ample reasons. 'In the light of the law as thus
established and administered, we think it would have been the
clear duty of the Court of Chancery, upon the facts shown in
the present case, upon the application of Mrs. Booth, as against
any attempt of her husband to control or dispose of the property
coming to her under Mr. Norton's will, to interpose in her behalf,
and secure support for herself and children out of said property;
and in case of such support having been obtained on her credit,
and in reliance on said property, to subject said property to the"
redemption of such credit, as a condition of entitling the husband to assert his marital rights in respect to it.
She, without occasion for invoking aid from that court, and
with the acquiescence, at least, of her husband, made use of that
property for just the purposes, and in just such a way, as a
means of obtaining support for herself and children, as the Court
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of Chancery would have authorized her to make. Upon the
strength of it she obtained credit for necessaries, and pledged it
for the redemption of that credit. It is now submitted whether
such use and disposition of it will be upheld and effectuated. At
this point it is worthy to be.repeated as -a striking feature of the
case, that not-Mr. Booth,- or any one standing in his right, but
Mrs. Booth and her subsequent grantee in mortgage, are claiming fo avoid the legitimacy of the use and disposition she made
of the property in her transactions with the orators. No case
is cited and no reason is assigned, bearingupon the equ'ti'es growing out of those transactions, or-the relation of the parties, why
the defendants shouldbe permitted to assert the invalidity of the
orators' security. But the defence is rested upon implications
eduoed from certain statutory provisions and upon arbitrary technicdl rules. We think -the former are'not warranted, and that.
the latter are inapplicable..
As between Mrs. Booth and the orators the equity is clear,
and there is no warrant, either in law or morals, for permitting
her or her subsequent mortgagee to oall in question the validity
of -the security given by her to the orators.
As M'r. Moore took his mortgage with full kiiowledge of the
existence of the mortgage to the orators, he is not entitled to
the .priority which he claims by reason of it.
As to his claim of a lien on the mortgaged property by reason
of payments made by him as executor, nothing is shown in the
case why -the land in Granville and the debts due the estate have
not been resorted to according to the provisions of the will. In
order to ehititle him to assert a lien"upon the'home-farm to affect
any legitimate disposition that has been made of it, it is incumbent on him to show that the provision made in the will for the
payment of debts and expenses, has been faithfully administered,
and has proved inadequate. As to all this the case is entirely
silent. There is, therefore, no ground for the lien claimed.
The pro forma decree of the Chancellor is reversed, with
costs,:and -the case remanded for a decree of foreclosure according to the prayer of-the bill.
I. 1. Nothing was earlier or more of equity recognised a right to a sepafirmly settled at common law than the rate estate in the wife: Witham V8.Wamerger of the wife's personality and terhouse, Tothill 91 (38 Eliz.); Flesheivil existence in that of the husband. ward vs. Jackson, Id. 94 (21 Jac.);
At an early day, however, the courts Bletsow vi. Sawyer, 1 Vern. 245. This
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being estabushed, the right of disposing
of such estate followed as a necessary
incident, and was also conceded at an
early day: Fettiplace vs. Gorges, 3 Bro.
C. C. 8.
2. But thejus disponendiisnot necessarily absolute. It might always be
qualifiedby express terms in the instrument creating the estate: 2 Story Eq.
1382, a. The troublesome question,
however, was as to the extent of the
wife's powers where there was no express
limitation of them in the deed of creation of the estate, and on this the courts
have been at variance for about a century. The point is stated very clearly
by Mr. Justice BARRtETT in the principal case, can a feme covert charge her
estate only in such manner and to such
extent as she is expressly authorized
by the deed of settlement, or can she
charge it for her own benefit or that of
her estate itself, as fully as if sole, provided there be no express restrictions
in the deed of settlement. The decisions upon this point are numerous and
contradictory, both in England and the
United States. The English cases have
been very elaborately reviewed in
Ewing vs. Smith, 3 Desaussure 427;
Jacques vs. M. E. Church, 17 Johns.
548; Yale vi. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450,
which are the leading American cases,
and in Parks vs. White, 11 Vesey Jr.
209, in which last case Lord ELDoN settled the English law in favor of the
wife's general powers as afeme sole except where limited by the deed creating the estate.
In the state of New York the question arose in Meth. Ep. Church vs.
Jacques, 3 Johns. Ch. 113, and Chancellor KENT, after a very careful examination of the cases decided against the
English doctrine, but the Court of Errors reversed his decision and expressly
adopted the English rule, 17 Johns. 548,
and this has been uniformly followed
in New York over since: N. A. Coal Co.

vs. Dyett, 7 Paige Ch. 1; Gardner vs.
Gardner, 22 Wend, 526; Curtis vs. Engel, 2 Sandf. Ch. 287; Yale vs. Dederer,
18 N.Y. 269; 22 N. Y. 450.
The same rule has been adopted in
Connecticut: Imlay vs. Huntington, 20
Conn. 146; in New Jersey, Leaycraft
vs. Hedden, 3 Green Ch. 512; in Ohio,
Hardy vs. Van Harlingen, 7 Ohio, N.
S. 208; in Missouri, Whitesides vs.
Cannon, 23 Mo. 457; Segond vs. Garland, Id. 547; in Maryland, Cooke vs.
Husbands, 11 Md. 492; Chew's Adi's.
vs. Beall, 13 Md. 348, which appear to
overrule the earlier decisions in Tarr
vs. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68, and Miller
vs. Williamson, 5 Md. 219; and now in
Vermont by t.e principal case, though
with a restriction which will be noticed
hereafter.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, in 1811, in
Ewing vs'. Smith, 3 Desaus. 417, also
examined the cases with great care, and,
reversing the decision of-the Chancellor, who had followed the English precedents, held the question to be res
nova in this country, and the better
principle to be that the feme covert has
no powers but those expressly given by
the deed of settlement, which is the
sole source or fountain of her authority.
The same rule has been adopted in
Pennsylvania, Lancaster vs. Dolan, 1
Rawle 231 (overruling the earlier case
of Newlin vs. Newlin, 1 S. & R. 275).
And this doctrine has been adhered to
in Pennsylvania with great strictness,
so that a feme covert's bond was held
absolutely void, though the deed of settlement gave her power to make a deed
under her hand and seal as if unmar-.
ried: Dorrance vs. Scott, 3 Whart. 309;
Wallace vs. Coston, 9 Watts 137. The
only exception that has been made is
in favor of the validity of a judgment
confessed by judgment-bond for the
purchase-money of real estate. Here
it has been held that the conveyance
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and the bond are one transaction, and
the feme covert takes the land subject to
the lien, the bond and judgment remaining void as against her generally:
Patterson vs. 'Robinson, 1 Casey 81;
Ramborger vs. Ingraham, 2 Wright 146.
It has also been held that a feme covert
may agree to a revival of a judgment
already obtained, though she cannot
confess judgment even for a debt for
improvement of her separate estate:
Bruner's Appeal (March, 1864, not
yet reported).
So a power to appoint was held -not to include a
power to devise by an instrument in
the nature of a will; Thomas vs.
Folwell, 2 Whart. 11; and where a
woman before marriage conveyed her
estate to trustees for her sole use, and
so that the rents and profits should not
be liable for her husband's debts, "but
be subject to her order alone," it was
held that this did not give her the
power to devise the etate by will:
Lyne's Exr. vs. Crouse et al., 1 Barr
111 ; and see, also, Rogers vs. Smith, 4
Barr 93; Steinman vs. Ewing, 7 Wright
63; and Wright vs. Brown el uz., 8
Wright 224, where a married woman's
mortgage of her separate estate (though
executed jointly with her husband and
with due formality), was declared void
because the deed of settlement did not
give the express power to sell or mortgage, and "on that subject," says
STROXo, J., "silence is prohibition."
The same rule is held in Rhode Island,
Metcalf vs. Cook, 2 R. I. 355; in Tennessee, Morgan vs. Elam, 4 Yerger
375; Marshall vs. Stephens, 8 Humphreys 159; Litton vs. Baldwin, Id.
209; Ware vs. Sharp, 1 Swan 489.
3. In addition to the question of
what thefeme covert's powers are when
not expressly limited by the deed of
settlement, there is also the important
question as to what words in such deed
shall constitute a limitation. In Pennsylvania and the states that follow the

same rule, of course the express language of the deed of settlement is the
touchstone by which all doubtful powers must be tried-where that does not
authorize any particular act, it is not
to be allowed. But in the other states
the presumption being in favor of full
powers, it has been usually held that a
greater power includes a less, as a
power to sell includes a power to mortgage, &c. ; and the expression of one
mode of alienation or charge does not
exclude other modes unless negative
words be used, as, e. g., the mention of
a power to convey by deed does not exclude a power to devise by will, &c.:
Imlay vs. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146;.
Hardy vs. Van Harlingen, 7 Ohio N. S.
208, and cases already cited. In Maryland, however, the rule appears to be
otherwise, as it is said in Cooke vs.
Husbands, 1"1 Ma. 492, that where no
enumeration is made in the deed, the
frme covert's powers are general, but
that it had been already decided in the
previous cases of Tarr vs. Williams, 4
Md. Ch. 68, and Miller vs. Williamson,
5 Md. 219, which it was not intended
to overrule, that the expression of one
mode was the exclusion of others. And
it may be the same rule will be followed
in New Jersey, it being a matter of
some doubt, as the Chancellor's words
are in Leaycraft vs. Hedden, 3 Green
Ch. 512, "if the terms of the deed require a particular mode of disposition,
then as clearly those terms must be observed," &c.
IL In the discussion so far, it has
been assumed that a power is claimed
and exercised, or a charge made on her
separate estate by a married woman, expressly, and it will be observed that in
the principal case, Mr. Justice BARRETT is careful to limit the decision to
the case in hand, where the charge was
expressly made on the separate estate.
But there is a large class of 'cases
where the question has been as to the
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extent to which the separate estate of a
feme covert will be charged where the
charge is not made upon it in express
terms. Without going into the cases
in detail, it may be said to be established:-71. That a feme cobert cannot make
herself liable, generally, either in person or estate.
2. Nor will her separate estate be
held liable in equity for her general
contracts.
8. But her separate estate will be
held liable for all debts, &c., which she
expressly or by -necedsary implication
charges upon it: 2 Story's Equity,
1397-99.
4. In most states it is held, that in
addition to the charge being either expressly made or necessarily implied to
be upon the separate estate, the debt
itself must be either for the benefit of
such estate or for her own benefit upon
the credit of it: Curtis vs. Enigel, 2
Sandf.,Ch. 287.
There has been much nicety of reasoning as to what 1wll atmount tbpro6f
of an intention to -charge the -separate
estate. Wlhere the debt is directly of
advantage to the estate itself, the in:tention to charge it has ben readili
infe6fed, btrt 'where the hdvuntage does
not accrue to the estate, it has been
generally held that the intention must
be affirmatively made out: "Koontz vs.
l IcNab, 16 Md. 549; and in New York
the -intention must appear in the 'very
contract which creates the debt: Tile
vs. Dederer, 22 N. Y. -46O. No satisfactory deneral rule hits yet been laid
dbwn, and Mr. Justice ST6RY gdmits
"the difficulty of distinguishing upon
aiy 'clear reasoning, 'what ground of
general presumption exists to infer dn
intention, not expressed, to charge any
particular debt onher separlte estate,
thdt 'i not applidable to her general
debts :" 2 Eq. 1401.
There is also some'discdelncyin'the

'authorities in regard to the ground on
which courts of equity enforce such
charges. It is perhaps most commonly
said, that the contract so to charge the
estate is pro tanto an execution of the
power of appointment, 2 Story's Eq.
'1399; but it is also said that the jurisdiction stands on the broad ground of
justice that the estate should answer
the debt. The early cases "proceeded
on the notion of a trust and plain
equity of requiring a married woman's
engagements entered into for her own
benefit, to be satisfied out of the trust
estate:" COMSTOCK, J., Yale vs. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 274.
IlL It is to be observed that these
are questions of -purely equitable jurisdiction, and have been discussed
-without reference'to the recent statutes
in the various states giving enlarged
powers to married women in relation
to their property.
Notwithstanding
these statutes, the doctrines discussed
are held to be still the rules In equity
'inmost states. Thus, in New York,
the Act of 1849, that "any married
female may take by intieritance, &c;,
and convey and devise real and personal,
property" as if unmarried, &c., is held
not to give her the -power to contract
debts generally: Yale vs. Dederer, 18
N. Y. 272. And in Pennsylvania the
Act of 1848 has been held not to enable a married woman to hold as a feme
sole, but as if the property were settled
to her separate "use: Bear's Adm. vs.
Bear,9 Casey 525; Penn. Co. vs. Foster, 11 Casey 134; Wright vs. Brown
et ux., 8 Wright 224.
So in New Jersey, Pentz vs. Simonson and wife, 2 Beasley 282; Skillman"
vs. Skillman, Id. 403; and it has been
generally held that the wife does not
acquire any right to her earnings, except in Connecticut, where it appears
to be given by the express language of
the statutes: Whiting et Wt. vs. BeckJ.T.M.
with, 31 Conn. 596.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
WARREN VS. PAUL.

The provision of the Internal Revenue Act of July 4, 1864, requiring writs in
state courts to be stamped, is not within the sphere of the legislative powers of
the Federal Government, and is inoperative.
Section 8 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States contains a delegation to Congress of power to suspend the writ of habeas corpu.

Appeal from the Elkhart Common Pleas.
Robert Lowry, for the appellant.
John H. Baker, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Suit to recover possession of personal property.
Suit dismissed by the court, on motion of defendant, and a return
of property (ordered, because papers were not stamped as required
by Act of Congress. The court refused permission to plaintiff to
affix stamps, in court, to avoid a dismissal. The Internal Revenue
Act of July 4th, 1864, enacts that stamps upon legal documents
shall be thus:"Writ, or other original process by which any suit is commenced in any court of record, either of law or equity, 50
cents.
" Where the amount claimed in a writ, issued by a court not
of record, is 100 dollars or over, 50 cents.
,,Upon every confession of judgment, or cognovit, for 100
dollars or over (except in those cases where the tax for the writ
of a commencement of suit has been paid), 50 cents.
,"Writs or other pyocess on appeals from justices' courts or
other courts of inferior jurisdiction to a court of record, 50
cents.
-Warrants of distress, when the amount of rent claimed does
not exceed 100 dollarsi 25 dents.
,When the amount claimed exceeds 100 dollars, 50 cents.
Provided, that no writ, summons, or other process issued by and
returnable to a justice of the peace, except as hereinbefore provided, or by any police or municipal court having no larger jurisdiction as to the amount of damages it may render than a justice
of the peace in the same state or issued in a criminal or other
PERKINS,
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suit commenced by the United States or any state, shall be subject to the payment of stamp duties; and provided, further,
that the stamp duties imposed by the foregoing Schedule B, on
manifests, bills of lading, and passage tickets, shall not apply to
steamboats or other vessels plying between ports of the United
States and ports in British North America.
" Affidavits in suits or legal proceedings shall be exempt from
stamp duties."
We quote this, being the latest act,' because it involves the
question to be decided, which is, has Congress power to tax legal
proceedings in the state courts?
The powers of Congress are delegated by the Constitution;
and " the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people."
We start out then, with the constitutional fact that state governments are to exist concurrently with the United States Government, possessed of independent powers, beyond the control
of the United States Government; for they and their people
possess all powers not granted to the United States. State
governments then are to exist.
The powers delegated to the general government are specified
in see. 8 of art. 1. Section 9 of the same article contains
restrictions and limitations on the powers granted generally in
section 8, and section 10 of the same article contains the prohibitions upon the states.
Section 8 of art. 1 delegates power to Congress to organize
courts, and therein, we may here remark, delegates to Congress
power both to authorize the issue and to suspend the issue of the
writ of habeas corpus, because that is a judicial writ, and the
power to organize courts includes the power of determining what
writs they may issue, or not issue, from time to time; hence it
was necessary to place the restriction upon the power thus delegated to Congress to legislate for the courts which is contained
in see. 9, viz.: that Congress should not, in so legislating, withhold from them the right to issue the well-known judicial writ of
habeas corpus, except, &c.
But there is no express delegation of power.in the Constitution
to Congress to legislate for state courts, and none ought to be
delegated incidentally.
The Constitution, in see. 8, delegates to Congress the power
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to lay and collect taxes, dutieA, imposts, and excises; but no
direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census, and
duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform, &c.
The Constitution seems to contemplate three kinds of taxes, as
within the power of Congress, viz.:
1. Direct taxes.
2. Duties or imposts.
3. Excises.
Such taxes Congress may lay and collect; and it certainly is
not clear that it can any other: 1 Story on Const., §§ 950, 951,
et seq. The stamp tax upon legal documents does not fall within
either of these classes. It is a tax on the right to justice: See
Smith's Wealth of Nations, p. 871; Say's Pol. Economy, 6th
Am. ed., p. 460, note; New Am. Cyclopedia, vol. 7, p. 865.
John Stuart Mill, in his late work on Political Economy, classesthis description of tax under the head of, "csome other taxes,"
vol. 2, p. 460; and on p. 465 of the same volume he says: "In
the enumeration of bad taxes, a conspicuous place must be
assigned to law taxes, which extract a revenue for the state from
the various operations involved in an application to the tribunals.
Like all needless expenses attached to law proceedings, they are
a.tax on redress, and therefore a premium on injury." He says
they have been mostly abolished in England, since their injustice
was so clearly demonstrated by Bentham : See Say, supra.
But conceding for the purposes of this case that Congress may
lay and collect stamp taxes, we hold that they cannot be laid by
that body on proceedings in the State Courts. This question is
not entirely new. In 1797 Congress passed a stamp act. The
point was then made, that Congress could not even require a
license from attorneys to practise in state courts, but might to
practise in the United States courts; and the law then enacted
respected the rights of the states in these particulars: Bent.
Deb., vol. 2, p. 155; Story's Laws of United States, vol. 1,
p. 466.
State governments, as we have seen, are to exist with judicial
tribunals of their own. This is manifest all the way through the
Constitution. This being so, those tribunals must not be subject
to be encroached upon or controlled by Congress. This would
be incompatible with their free existence. It was held when
Congress created a United States bank, and is now decided when
the United States has given bonds for borrowed money, that as
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Congress had rights to create such fiscal agents and issue such
bonds, it would be incompatible with the full and free enjoyment
of those rights to allow that the states might tax the bank or
bonds; because, if the right to so tax them was conceded, the
states might exercise the right to the destruction of congressional
power. The argument applies with full force to the exemption
of state governments from federal legislative interference.
There must be some limit to the power of Congress to lay
stamp taxes. Suppose a state to form a new or to amend her
existing constitution, could Congress declare that it should be
void unless stamped with a Federal stamp? Can Congress require state legislatures to stamp their bills, journals, laws, &c.,
in order that they shall be valid ? Can it require the Executive
to stamp all commissions ? If so, where is he to get the mone7 ?
Can Congress compel the state legislatures to appropriate it ?
Can Congress tlus subjugate a state by legislation ? We think
this will scarcely be pretended. Where then is the line. of dividing power in this particular ? Could Congress require voters in
state and corporation elections to stamp their tickets to render
them valid ?

Under the old confedeiation Congress legislated upon states,
not upon the citizens of the state. The most important change
wrought in the government by the Constitution was that legislation operated upon the citizens directly, enforced by Federal tribunals and agencies, not upon the states.
Another established constitutional principle is that the Government of the United States, while sovereign within its sphere, is
still limited in jurisdiction and power to certain specified subjects: See Hfopklns vs. Jones, decided at this term.
Taking these three propositions, then, as true:
1. States are to exist with independent powers and institutions
within their spheres.
2. The Federal Government is to exist with independent powers and institutions within its sphere.
3. The Federal Government operates, within its sphere, upon
the people in their individual capacities, as citizens and subjects
of that government, within its sphere of power, and upon its own
officers and institutions as a part of itself.
Taking these propositions as true, we say, it seems to result as
necessary to harmony of operation between the Federal and state
governments, that the Federal Government must be limited, in
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its right to lay and collect stamp taxes, to the citizens, and their
transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal Government,
officially or otherwise; and cannot be laid upon and collected
from iidividuals on their proceedings when acting, not as citizens, transacting business with each other as such, but officially,
or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and through state official
agencies and institutions. When thus acting, they are not act,ing under the jurisdiction nor within the power of the United
States; not acting as subjects of that government, nor within its
sphere of power over them ; and neither they nor their proceedings are subject to interference from the United States. Can
Congress regulate or prescribe the taxation of costs in a state
court ? The Federal Government may tax the governor of the
state, or the clerk of a state court, and his transactions, as an
individual, but not as a state officer. This must be so, or the.
state may be annihilated at the pleasure of the Federal Government. The Federal Government may, perhaps, take by taxation most of the property in a state, if exigencies require, but it
has not a right, by direct or indirect means, to annihilate the
functions of the state government.
PER CURIAM.-The

'udgment below is reversed with costs.

Cause remanded, &c.
AMERIOAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

We have received, in addition to the
above ctse, a largd number of decisions
of the highest judicial tribunals of
different states, upon different and
highly important constitutional questions, affecting the functions and powers of the National and State Governments, and their relations to each other
under the present Federal Government,
all of which we should be glad to give
at length in our pages, but tbatwould so
far occupy our space as to exclude everything else. We have only the choice
loft, of wholly omitting all reference to
them, or of attempting to make an intelligible abstract of the points decided,
and the course of argument resorted to
by the courts.
Notwithstanding the
labor and difficulty attending the latter
Von. XIII-11

coutse, we have, after considerable
hesitation, attempted it.
1. In regard to the question of
the right of soldiers to vote, while
beyond the limits of the several states
to -which they belong, there have
been a considerable number of decisions made in the different states, to
which w4 have not before alluded.
The question was very extensively
and learnedly discussed by the Supreme
Court of California, SIHArTEn, J., delivering the leading opinion, which
contains a very creditable amount of
research and learning upon the general
question of the propriety of the courts
of last resort declaring acts of the
legislature unconstitutional, on the
ground of supposed conflict with either
the letter, or the constructive import,
of the organic law of the state or gov-
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ernment, and reaching the very obvious conclu-ion that this may and must
be done, in all cases of obvious and
satisfactorily established conflict. The
majority of the court here held, that
where the constitution required the
elector to be a resident of the county
"in which he claims his vote," this necessarily implied that he could only
cast his vote in the county of his residence;
that the phrase "in which he claims his
vote," upon any fair, manly, and sensible construction, must mean the same
as, in which he offers his vote, or in
which he votes, or any similar form of
expression.
It seems to us that the conclusion of
the court here is most unquestionable,
and that the decisions of some of the
other state courts, wherein a different
conclusion is reached, are not maintainable upon any fair and just ground of
argument, as is very clearly shown in
the very learned and lawyerlike exposition of the question in the elaborate
opinion of Mr. Justice SHAFTE , to
which we beg to refer the profession,
as containing a large amount of-.the
most valuable matter, presented in the
most perspicuous and unexceptionable
form.
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in a
very carefully prepared and satisfactory
opinion, held, that where the restriction
of the state constitution in regard to
voting within the precinct of the residence of the elector, was, in terms,
limited to the casting of votes for state
officers, and no such provision was found
in that. instrument in regard to voting
for electors of President and Vice-President and members of Congress, that
it was competent for the legislature to
provide for taking the votes of the
electors for such offices without the
limits of the state. And subsequently,
the Supreme Court of the state of New
Hampshire adopted the same view in

regard to the constitution of that state,
partly upon the authority of the decision in Vermont.
- 2. The Supreme Court of California,
at the July Term, 1864, made two very
important decisions affecting questions
of currency, in both of which very able
and learned, and, to our mind, satisfactory opinions, were delivered by Mr.
Justice CuRv.Y.

The first of these opinions recognises
the validity of the Act of Congress of
the 25th February, 1862, making the
paper issued from the Treasury of the
United States, a legal tender for all
debts, public and private, whether created before or after the date of the Act.
This is certainly a very important and
difficult question, and one in regard to
which there exists great contrariety of
opinion, both as to its policy, justice,
and validity.
We could do nothing more here than
to indicate the course of argument
adopted by the court, and in regard to
which the different members seem to
have concurred.
The right of the
United States Government to declare
their own paper a currency, and a legal
tender upon all private contracts, whether created before or after such declaration, is here attempted to be vindicated upon the ground that the right
and the power to create and to control
the currency of the country, is one of
those functions delegated by the people
of the several states in the United
States Constitution. This is argued,
with great force and ingenuity, both
from the necessity of such a provision,
in order to the successful carrying out
and accomplishment of its other expressly delegated powers; and also
from the fact that certain analogous
acts bearing upon this governmental
function are expressly prohibited from
being exercised by the several states.
The same view has been maintained

WARREN vs. PAUL.
in the New York Court of Appeals, in
the case of.Meyer vs. ltosevelt, and in
other causes; and the question is now
pending, we believe, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, where it will
be likely to receive an authoritative determination in the course of itsapproaching session.
We desire here to call attention to a
recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Indiana, in the case of Thayer vs.
Hedges, May Term, 1864, where the
following points were ruled:1. At the adoption of the Constitution, all governmental power was in
the states; and in the division of it
made by the adoption of the Constitution, the Federal Government received
only what was granted to it, the states
retaining the residuum, except so far
as it was extinguished entirely by prohibitions upon the states.
2. The prohibition of a power to the
states, did not of itself operate as a
grant of the power to the Federal Government, but rather as an extinguishment of the power as a governmental
one, where a grant of it was not made
in the Constitution to the Federal Government.
3. The power to coin money is one
power, and the power to deqlare anything a legal tender is another and different power; both were possessed by
the states severally at the adoption of
the Constitution; by that adoption, the
power to coin money -was delegated to
the Federal Government, while the
power to declare a legal tender was not,
but was retained by the states with a
limitation, thus: "Congress shall have
power to coin money," &c. "No state
'
shall coin money ;" and " no state shall
make anything but gold and silver coin
a legal tender," &c. States, then,
though they cannot coin money, can
declare that gold or silver coin, or both,
whether coined by the Federal, or the

Spanish, or the Mexican Government,
shall be legal tender. And as Congress
was authorized to make money only out
of coin, and the states were forbidden
to make anything but coin a legal tender, a specie currency was secured in
both the Federal and State Governments. There was thus no need of
delegating to Congress the power of
declaring a legal tender in transactions
within the domain of Federal legislation. The money coined by it was the
necessary medium.
4. The words delegating to Congress
power "to coin money," regulate the
value thereof and "of foreign coin,"
do not include the right to make coined
money out of paper. If they do, then
the states have a right to make such
money a legal tender. It does violence
to the language to give it such a meaning.
6. The power to declare paper a legal tender is not incidental to any
power delegated by the Constitution.
It is not important here to dijcuss
the comparative soundness of these
conflicting decisions. If we were to
express an opinion, we might feel compelled to dissent, in some particulars,
from both the views thus presented.
1. It seems diffcult to argue, with
much apparent fairness or plausibility,
that it could have been the purpose,
either of the framers of the United
States Constitution or of the conventionsof the people by which it was adopt
ed, that the question of currency should
not have been exclusively conferred
upon the National Government. And
at the same time the form of expression
used in the -prohibition to the states
seems to imply, that but for the prohibition it might be claimed that the several states had power to "emit bills of
credit," and "to make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt ;" and it may, therefore,
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be argued, with some plausibility, that
the general power over the question of
what shall be a tender in payment of
debts, with the limitation that it shall
not extend to any thing but "gold and
silver coin," was still retained by the
states.
2. But when it is considered that
from the first the construction has been
otherwise, and all tenders in payment
of debts have been regulated by the
Acts of Congress upon that subject,
and the states have all acquiesced in
yielding that function of government to
the National Legislature, it must have
great weight against the soundness of
a contrary claim at this late day.
8. It may also be added, with equal
force and plausibility, we think, that
from all the provisions contained in the
United States' Constitution, both positive and negative, as well in regard to
the state as the National Government,
it appears very certain that at the time
of the adoption of the United States
Constitution, no one would ever have
dreamed or imagined that the National
Government would ever have attempted
to create any currency, and to make the
same a legal tender for debts, even
those existing at the time, except gold
and silver coin. But the power to do a
thing, and the probability of its being
done, are very different matters. And
when this awful crisis, as unforeseen
as it was incomprehensible, came, and
the National Legislature made this desperate resort in the public finances to
sustain the public credit,we cannot affect
to deny, that we expected the courts,
both state and national, would feel compelled to sanction its legality, from the
mere fact that it was nowhere expressly
prohibited to thb National Government,
and that it did come within the general
scope of other functions constructively
given. But while it seems to us that
upon any ground of d priori reasoning,

fairly conducted, it was very obvious,
no such power as to create a legal currency and a legal tender out of their
own bills of credit was given; still,
having been assumed and acted upon
to such an overwhelming extent, there
does seem to be a kind of necessity of
maintaining its legality, the same as of
prescriptive rights, which have been
maintained for centuries, in order to
escape the shaking of the very property
foundations of society. The very extent of this currency making it equally
indispensable that its validity be maintained as if it had existed and been recognised for centuries; the very magnitude of the interest supplying, in
some sense, the want of the lapse of
time.
We desire here to say, too, that it
seems to us that the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the case of The
Bank of Commerce vs. The City of New
York, 2 Black R. 620, in holding that
the states cannot tax the owner of
United States stock for its amount, as
a source of income, in common with his
other sources of income, have assumed
a position which is not maintainable,
either upon the ground of necessity or
policy, and one from which they will
be compelled to recede ultimately, unless they are prepared to extinguish
the chief source of taxation in the
states at one blow. That court has
sometimes been suspected of leaning
too much in favor of the vindication
of state rights. But whatever offences
they may have heretofore committed in
that direction, we think, whether ignorantly or not, they have here assumed
a proposition altogether unimportant
to the vindication of the extremest prerogatives of the powers and functions
of the National Government, but which
lays the axe, fatally and irrevocably, at
the very root of all vitality in state sovereignty. We must say that, for one
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we were amazed to find that court reversing the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals upon this ground,
notwithstanding the earlier cases upon
the question contained some intimations
in that direction.
The other question to which we referred, as having been decided by the
California Supreme Court, had reference to specific contracts payable in
gold or silver coin. The legislature of
that state passed a statute, April 27,
1863, upholding this class of contracts,
and providing that the judgment and
execution thereon should require payment specifically in the kind of money
specified in the contract. The contract
in suit was dated April 2, 1864, and
provided for payment in United States
gold coin. The defendantrefused payment in that mode, but tendered payment in United States tender notes.
The leading question made in the
case was in regard to the validity of the
California statute requiring payment in
coin, whenever the parties so stipulated. The court found their opinion,
upholding the validity of the statute,
mainly upon the argument that gold
coin is a commercial commodity, always
bought and sold in the market, or liable
to be so bought and sold, when for any
cause the currency of.the country is
depreciated and the rate of foreign exchange proportionally enhanced; and
that in such cases a specific contract
for coin is not adequately compensated
by a judgment for damages, payable in
such depreciated currency, thus bring
ing this class of contracts within the
principle of that class in which courts
of equity decree specific performance,
because the thing contracted for possesses an artificial value to the payee
above the amount of pecuniary damages, which a court of law can award
for its breach. And it seems to us this
argument is unanswerable. In Wood

vs. Bullens, 6 Allen 516, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held,
that upon a contract payable in specie
the payee could recover no more at law
than the sum specified in the contract,
whatever premium specie bore at the
time. This will surely afford very good
ground for the interposition of a court
of equity to decree specific performance.
And the California statute, in effect,
only provides for doing this at law by
the form of awarding execution.
We have extended these discussions
so far that we can devote but little
space to the principal case to which
this note is appended.
. it has seemed to us most unquestionable, from the very first, that Congress*
could not impose a specific tax of any
kind upon any of the indispensable
governmental functions of the states,
whether by way of license to the attorneys and counsellors practising in state
courts, or of stamp duties upon their
processes. This would be, in effect, to
recognise in the National Legislature
the power of prohibition. The power
to tax or to license implie's the power to
carry such taxation to the extent of
prohibition, or to annex such conditions
to the license as will amount to a virtual prohibition. This is a familiar
rule in thedecisions of the Nationaltribunal of last resort. McCullough vs.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. R. 316; Redfield
on Railways 626, and cases cited in
note.
This is the only principle upon which
-that court attempt to vindicate the
stock of the United States, or of the
United States Bank, from taxation by
the states. And, to be consistent, they
must extend, and we have no doubt they
will extend, the same exemption to all
the instruments of the state governments. And to be entirely consistent
with the rule which theyhave attempted
to apply to United States stock, by de-
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nying the right to the states to tax it, from interest on money loaned the
as a source of income merely, they states, and various other sources analoshould not only exempt the instruments gous. But we do not think all this is
of the state administration from specific demanded in order to create the practitaxation, by way of stamp or license cal independence of the state governduties, but they should not allow the ments. And we look confidently for
National Government to impose a tax the ultimate adoption of a similar rule
upon income arising from state salaries in regard to the right to tax the income
or from practice in the state courts, or from National stocks.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Penvslvania.
M'ENROY ET AL. vs. DYER.
It is too late to object to the competency of a witness after his testimony has
been given and commented on to the jury by the party objecting.
In an action of trespass de bonis asportatis, the general rule for. the measure of
damages is the value of the goods at the time of the taking, or their highest
value between that time and the trial, with interest and damages for any acts of
outrage or oppression that may have accompanied the taking.
But where there has been a redelivery of the goods to the owner or a reacquisition by him, as by purchase at a sale, &c., the measure of damages is what it
has cost him to regain possession, what he has lost by the temporary deprivation
of the use of the goods, and such other damages as will make compensation for
the injury.
Laying out of view what may be recovered in trespass for outrage or oppression in the taking, there is no difference in the measure of damages whether the
action be trespass or trover.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STR" NG, J.-We do not perceive that the witness, Simon
Barnes, had any interest such as to disqualify him from testifying in behalf of the plaintiff. If the property levied upon and
sold under the execution against Barnes and Jennings was a part
of the realty on the 29th day of May, 1855, when the assignment
of the mills, buildings, and improvements was made to Dyer,
clearly there was no warranty of title, and therefore no interest.
If the articles levied upon had been detached before the assignment, and had become personalty, they were not embraced in the
assignment, and in that case there was no implied warranty. In
any aspect of the case the interest of the witness is not apparent. But were it not so, it was too late to ask the court to withdraw his testimony from the jury after it had been received
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without objection, used by the plaintiffs in error and commented
upon by them to the jury: Bees vs. Livingston, 5 Wright 119.
The only important question in the case is, whether the court
below applied a correct rule for the assessment of damages. It
was an action of trespass against a constable and another for
levying upon and selling the plaintiff's goods under an execution
against Barnes and Jennings.
The goods had been sold at the constable's sale, and there was
sotne evidence they had been bought in for the plaintiff. The
court instructed the jury that the measure of damages was not
what had been paid at the constable's sale, but the value of the
property at the time the sale was made, with interest thereon
from that date. This was a correct enunciation of the rule as
applicable to ordinary cases of trespass de bonis asportatis, but
it is applicable only to cases where the owner has not regained
possession of the goods before the trial. If, in this case, the
property seized and sold by the constable was bought in by the
plaintiff, or for him, at a price less than its value at the time of
the seizure or the sale, that value was not in any just sense, a
measure of the injury caused by the act of the constable. What
the law seeks to secure in an assessment of damages to an injured
party is compensation. He can ask no more than to be made
whole. In most instances a levy and sale of a plaintiff's goodfs
for the debt of another depfives him entirely of the property,
and nothing less than its value therefore would be compensation.
But if there has been a redelivery to him, or if he has reacquired
it, he may be compensated with less. He is then entitled to what
it has co~t him to regain possession, to what he has lost by the
temporary deprivation of the use of the chattels, and to such
other damages as are commensurate with the injury. No other
rule than this will do complete justice, and it is supported by
authority. In actions of trover it has often been held, that
though there was a complete conversion, and though the general
rule in the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the
time of the conversion or the highest value at any time between
the conversion and the trial, yet if they have been regained by
the .plaintiff before the trial, that fact goes in mitigation of
damages. In such a case the value of the use of the goods
during the period in which the plaintiff was deprived of posses-.
sion, with any injury to the property itself, and the expense of
recovering it, have been declared to be full compensation. In
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Cook vs. Hartle, 8 Car. & Payne 570, a plaintiff was not allowed
to recover the value of the goods which had been converted to
the use of the defendant and afterwards returned. The same
rule was held in Moon vs. Badphael, 2 Bingh. N. C. 310. In
Baldwin vs. Porter,12 Conn. 473, which was trover for saw-logs
the defendants had seized in execution, and sold as the property
of Birdsey Baldwin, it was held, the fact that Baldwin had bid
in the property at the sale for the plaintiffs, who were the true
owners, was admissible in mitigation of damages, and the real
damages were declared to be the sum paid at the sale. The same
doctrine was asserted in Curtis vs. Ward, 20 Conn. 204, and in
Massachusetts in Piercevs. Benjamin, 14 Pick. 861, and Greenfield Bank vs. Leavitt, 17 Pick. 161. So, also, in New York,
Reynolds vs. Shuler, 5 Cowen 323; and in Ewing vs. Blount,
20 Alabama 694, the principle was asserted in strong terms.
These were actions of trover, it is true ; but there is no reason
for a different rule in trespass. In both the general principle is
that a plaintiff is entitled to such damages as he-has actually
sustained. In both the value of the property lost by the plaintiff is the general standard of measurement of damages, laying
out of consideration what may be recovered in trespass for acts
of outrage and oppression accompanying the taking. What will
make the plaintiff whole is the same in one form of action as in
the other. No distinction is recognised by the courts. In Baker
vs. Freeman, 9 Wendell 36, it was decided that where the goods
of a party had been sold under illegal process, and they had been
bid off at the sale by an agent of the owner who purchased for
the benefit of his principal and paid his bid with the money of
the principal, the measure of damages in an action of trespass
was the amount of the bid and interest, and not the value of the
property sold. And in Brace vs. Head, 3 Dana (Ky.) Reports
491, which was an action of trespass de bonis asportatis, for
goods illegally sold on execution, it was holden that if the proceeds of the sale went to the plaintiff's benefit, this would operate
to mitigate the damages: See, also, Clark vs. Halleck, 16 Wendell 607.
-by vs. S eumacher, 5 Casey 40, cannot be regarded as asserting a contrary doctrine. There the goods had been seized
in transituto the owner as the property of a third person. An
action of trespass was brought, and it was then agreed between
the owner and attaching creditor, that the property might be

